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Reassessing the Polish Brethren on Magistracy, Pacifism, and Warfare in the 
Seventeenth Century 
Francesco Quatrini 
Queen’s University Belfast 
 
Abstract. The Polish Brethren, usually known as Socinians, were perhaps the most infamous 
Christian sect belonging to the so-called ‘Radical Reformation’. Renowned for their anti-
Trinitarian beliefs and their rationalistic approach towards religion, the Brethren discussed also 
theological-political concepts such as the legitimacy of magistracy and warfare. Relevant 
literature on the Brethren’s socio-political views underestimate the Brethren's participation in 
contemporary debates on the ius belli, describing them as pacifists who generally opposed 
politics and violence until the 1650s, when some of them began defending a more conventional 
approach towards magistracy and warfare. The article proves that this shift toward a more 
standard Protestant position occurred as early as the 1620s, when Johannes Crell and Jonas 
Szlichtyng, two of the most prominent spokespersons among the Brethren, reconciled politics 
and the Brethren’s faith in their writings. The article highlights how the very historical situation 
of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth urged them to revise their views on magistracy and 
warfare, and it argues that they were assisted in this by their education in European universities, 
especially the Lutheran Academy of Altdorf near Nuremberg, which provided them with 





The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were deeply marked by religious warfare. Almost 
permanent conflict with the Turkish Empire, colonial attacks against the heathens and idolaters 
of non-European countries, and strife among Christian sects kept alive a doctrine of holy war 
that could mobilize large numbers of believers. At the same time, this gradually enabled the 
development of a common and inter-confessional ideology of just war.1 Indeed, these centuries 
witnessed  the development of a large literature on the ius belli, ‘the right of war’, which 
included discussions on the ius ad bellum – legitimate reasons to wage a war – and the ius in 
bello – legitimate ways to fight a war. While many rejected the use of force and war to impose 
religious beliefs on others, justifications of the use of force to defend oneself, one’s goods, or 
one’s country were quite common among all European intellectuals, regardless of their 
confession of faith. These justifications were mostly based on the Roman law of self-defence, 
vim vi repellere, which means ‘to repel force through force’ and was generally regarded as a 
natural law. This very natural law was also the main basis upon which resistance to tyrants or 
sovereigns that were not regarded as legitimate for either religious or political reasons could 
be justified.2  
Nevertheless, some Christian minorities – such as the Dutch Mennonites and the 
Anabaptist Moravian Brethren – did not adopt this mainstream approach toward self-defence 
and warfare. Believing that the natural law vim vi repellere was contrary to Christ’s teaching, 
they completely rejected any use of force and denied the legitimacy of warfare, embracing a 
broad pacifism instead. Pacifism can be broadly defined as a practical and intellectual devotion 
to peace and opposition to war, which includes ‘a variety of commitments on a continuum from 
an absolute adherence to nonviolence in all actions to a more focused or minimal sort of anti-
warism’.3 The Polish Brethren – whom scholars in the field refer to as Socinians, from the 




In this paper, I examine the development of the Brethren’s views when addressing three 
essential questions: is it legitimate for a Christian to hold a public office such as lesser or 
supreme magistrate? If so, is it legitimate for a Christian magistrate to condemn someone to 
the death penalty and to wage wars against other nations? Finally, is it legitimate for private 
Christians to participate in wars? In describing the Brethren’s answers to these questions, the 
main goal of this paper is reassessing precisely when it was that the Brethren reconsidered their 
pacifist approach to magistracy and warfare. Indeed, it is usually accepted that the Brethren 
discarded their original pacifist ideas in the late 1640s or 1650s, thanks to the works of Jonas 
Szlichtyng (or Schlichting; 1592–1661) and Samuel Przypkowski (1592–1670). Janusz Tazbir, 
for instance, described the Brethren’s ‘socio-political programme’ as ‘marked by an unfriendly 
or even hostile attitude to the state and to all forms of violence and oppression, including war’. 
Referring to Szlichtyng’s treatise published against the Lutheran theologian Balthasar Meisner, 
Tazbir then asserted that in 1636, Szlichtyng was still maintaining ‘that even though the state 
had the power to punish people by death and to conduct wars, a true Christian should have 
nothing to do with this’. Tazbir relied on Stanislas Kot’s fundamental study of the Brethren's 
socio-political views, which indeed argued that Szlichtyng turned away from the early pacifism 
of his church only in the late 1640s, a conclusion shared by Peter Brock as well.5 Being well 
established that the Brethren changed their socio-political views in the course of the 
seventeenth century, it then becomes fundamental to know precisely in which sense they 
changed these views and when this occurred. The analysis of primary sources offered in this 
paper is intended precisely for this purpose and by contrast, proves that Szlichtyng had 
developed different views by the time he replied to Meisner in 1636, allowing Christian 
magistrates to wage defensive wars and private Christians to participate in them. Moreover, 
Szlichtyng was assisted in this by his friend and mentor Johannes Crell (1590–1633), who had 
developed a much more standard position on magistracy and Christianity already in 1623.6 The 
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Brethren were thus beginning to abandon their pacifism twenty years earlier than historians 
have previously noted.  
A thorough examination of the reasons that pushed Crell and Szlichtyng to change their 
views on magistracy and warfare is beyond the scope of this paper. In the following, however, 
I will suggest two likely causes. First, the active participation of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in several wars from the early seventeenth century onwards. Second, the 
growing openness of the second generation of Brethren towards the intellectual European 
milieu. From the early 1600s onwards, young Brethren went abroad to attend famous 
academies and universities, especially the Lutheran Academy of Altdorf near Nuremberg. This 
provided the Brethren with new and different perspectives on philosophical, theological, and 
political matters. In this paper, I will particularly focus on the Academy of Altdorf. Indeed, as 
highlighted by Sarah Mortimer, the second generation of Socinians educated at the University 
of Altdorf played a fundamental role in re-shaping the Brethren’s theology in the seventeenth 
century.7 In Altdorf, these same Brethren met also scholars holding and teaching ideas on 
magistracy and warfare quite different from those defended by Socinus and the Brethren 
forefathers, and this certainly made the young Brethren aware of the broader inter-confessional 
European debates on the ius belli, in which they would take active part from the 1620s onward.  
 
I 
The Polish Brethren were members of the Minor Reformed Church of Poland, which flourished 
in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1658. This church originated around 1563, when 
the Polish Reformed Church split into two groups because of the anti-Trinitarian views 
embraced by some of its adherents.8  The Brethren are renowned today for their anti-Trinitarian 
beliefs; their principle of applying natural reason to interpret the Scriptures and religious 
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dogmas; and their advocacy of freedom of religion and toleration.9 Mortimer has also rightly 
emphasized that the ‘insistence upon the role of human beings in their own salvation’ and the 
‘commitment to Christianity as a religion of supernatural rewards and stringent ethics’ were 
other common beliefs among the Brethren.10 These were the same doctrines that made them 
increasingly (in)famous throughout sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. However, it 
can be hardly said that they were a homogenous group. Differences about other theological 
beliefs and socio-political views arose as soon as the Minor Church was established.11 For 
instance, they often debated whether Christ should be adored as divine, even if he was only a 
human being, or whether Adam was mortal before the fall.12 The relationship between politics 
and the Christian religion was one of the most controversial. The controversies concerned two 
main inter-related subjects. Firstly, the relationship between private Christianity and secular 
power, which included discussions on: whether Christians could hold civil offices as sovereign 
or as lesser magistrates, whether Christians could exercise the right to inflict corporal 
punishments and the death penalty (or ius gladii, ‘the right of the sword’) when holding these 
offices, and whether Christians could appeal to magistrates for justice. Secondly, the 
relationship between the Christian religion and the natural law vim vi repellere, which included 
disputes on the legitimacy of private self-defence and of warfare to defend one’s country.  
It is possible to distinguish two main parties involved in these controversies. On the one 
hand, there were those who denied that Christians could actively participate in civil life. As the 
Christian religion is not of this world, true believers should not hold public offices or take part 
in wars, even defensive ones. Rejecting the law vim vi repellere as contrary to the Christian 
religion, they also argued that true Christians should not defend themselves when attacked, but 
rather they should run away or endure the assault, even accepting death. On the other hand, 
other Brethren held a more standard position on the relationship between Christian religion and 
politics, allowing the existence of Christian magistrates and participation in defensive wars. 
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They also allowed private self-defence, even if some of them stressed that one should at least 
try not to kill his or her attacker. These discussions on magistracy and warfare were particularly 
relevant for the Brethren. Since its very beginning, the Minor Church managed to gain the 
support of some noblemen and members of the gentry who had a legal duty to join the army 
personally in case of war. If they failed to do so and disobeyed the order of the King without a 
justifiable excuse, their property would be confiscated and they would be deprived of the 
privileges connected with their noble status.13  
It should be emphasized that the pacifist Brethren did not deny political authority per 
se, as many of their opponents accused them of doing. They rather denied that those holding 
civil offices – be they sovereigns or lesser magistrates – could be true Christians. They believed 
in a (perhaps utopian) complete separation from all that belonged to the ordinary civil and 
political life. Over the sixteenth century, support among the Brethren gradually shifted towards 
the pacifist party. Faustus Socinus contributed much to their success.14 In his last years, Socinus 
slightly modified his views, allowing Christians to hold public offices and to bear arms. At the 
same time, he was still arguing that Christians must absolutely refrain from killing anyone, be 
they private citizens or public magistrates. Moreover, he carefully avoided examining whether 
a Christian magistrate can justly wage a war to defend his or her country.15 In 1614, Valentin 
Schmalz (or Smalcius; 1572–1622) made his views on these questions much more clear, when 
replying to the Lutheran Wolfgang Franz.16 According to Smalcius, Christians are allowed to 
hold public offices and a Christian magistrate has the same ius gladii that non-Christian 
magistrates have, but he should use this right with moderation, avoiding the most severe 
punishments whenever he can. Moreover, a Christian magistrate can never sentence someone 
to death, because ‘it is not legitimate for the Christian magistrate to shed blood’. This does not 
mean to detract from the magistrate, Smalcius states, as ‘it is legitimate for the magistrate to 
repress criminals through other means that are perhaps more severe than the shedding of 
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blood’.17 This unconditional prohibition of killing other human beings naturally affected 
Smalcius’s views on wars. Casting aside Socinus’s ambiguities, Smalcius writes that ‘we deny 
that it is legitimate to wage war and we affirm earnestly that it is unworthy of the Christian 
piety’.18  He does not even allow wars to defend one’s country. There are different means to 
avoid a war, Smalcius says, and when it is impossible to prevent it, then the sovereign should 
rather opt for a spontanea deditio, ‘a voluntary surrender’.19  
Although Smalcius was still restraining the rights of Christian magistrates and denying 
the legitimacy of defensive wars, the intellectual atmosphere in Raków was likely changing. 
Two reasons can be suggested for this gradual change. First, the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth was almost continuously at war in the first three decades of the seventeenth 
century.20 This included severe attacks from the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy, as well as the 
war against Sweden (1626–29) and the Smoleńsk War (1632–4).21 At the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the Commonwealth had to face the Zebrzydowski rebellion as well (1606–
09), a brief civil war prompted by members of the Polish gentry who saw their political liberties 
threatened by king Sigismund III Vasa.22 The Brethren did not remain indifferent to such 
conflicts, as their pacifist attitude would have required them to do. Jakub Sienieński, patron 
and protector of Raków, joined the Zebrzydowski rebellion.23 Moreover, Brethren belonging 
to the nobility or the gentry actively participated in the aforementioned and subsequent wars, 
distinguishing themselves in battle. For instance, prominent Brethren families such as 
Moskorzowski and Przypkowksi fought on king Władysław IV’s side at Smoleńsk.24 The 
Brethren’s synods at Raków in 1604 and 1605 even passed specific resolutions allowing the 
resistance against the Tatars who had invaded Podolia.25 This proves that there was a clear 
dichotomy between the pacifist doctrines as defended by leaders such as Socinus and Smalcius 
and the practical historical situation the Brethren had to face. A reconciliation between their 
ideas on warfare, their need to defend themselves, and their duty to participate in the Polish 
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wars was therefore required. The fact that the second generation of Brethren showed 
themselves much more keen to participate in wider European debates favoured such a 
reconciliation, and this is the second reason why the Brethern adopted a new approach to 
politics and warfare. Indeed, when developing more conventional ideas on these subjects, 
Brethren such as Crell and Szlichtyng came closer to the standard Protestant thinking on 
politics and religion, a tradition that they first encountered personally at the Academy of 
Altdorf during their formative years.  
 
II 
The Lutheran Academy of Altdorf near Nuremberg, known as Academia Norica, was the main 
centre in the German territories from where the Brethren views spread at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. Established as a humanist gymnasium by Philipp Melanchthon in 1526 in 
Nuremberg, it was moved to Altdorf in 1575 and reorganized according to the model of the 
hochschule in Strasburg. Three years later the Emperor Rudolph II promoted the school to the 
status of a semi-universitas, which finally received university privileges in 1622, except for the 
Faculty of Theology, which received the same privileges only in 1692.26 After 1575, students 
came from all the Lutheran territories of the Empire, as well as from nearby countries, such as 
Hapsburg Bohemia and Silesia, and, more importantly, the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth.27 However, it was not the Polish students who introduced the Brethren’s ideas 
into the Academy, but rather one of its professors, Ernst Soner. 
Ernst Soner (1572–1612) was the son of a Lutheran merchant in Nuremberg and studied 
philosophy and medicine at the Academia Norica. After completing his studies, he started a 
long academic journey that eventually brought him into contact with Andrzej Wojdowski 
(1565–1622) and Christopher Ostorodt (c.1560–1611) in 1598, two Brethren missionaries. 
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Their preaching and the books they were carrying with them succeeded in persuading Soner to 
embrace anti-Trinitarian beliefs. Soner went back to Altdorf in 1605 to lecture in philosophy 
and medicine at the Academia Norica. From 1605 to his death, he became the leading 
intellectual promoting anti-Trinitarian views in Germany. While in Altdorf, he established a 
circle of crypto-Socinians, which would be discovered only after his death, and converted two 
of the most famous non-Polish Brethren, that is, Crell and Marcin (or Martin) Ruar (1589–
1657).28 The presence of an anti-Trinitarian group of students in Altdorf became publicly 
known in 1615 and in 1616. The students Johannes Vogel and Joachim Peuschel were 
condemned as the leading figures of the anti-Trinitarian circle in Altdorf and many of Soner’s 
books and manuscripts were publicly burned.29 
The significance of Soner’s role in the development of Brethren views is 
unquestionable. At the same time, there is no doubt that the young Brethren came into contact 
with other scholars teaching at Altdorf. This is what, for instance, Crell’s biographer 
emphasized when recalling Crell’s time at the Academia Norica, mentioning several famous 
intellectuals who had a decisive role in Crell’s education: 
 
Altdorf was then blessed by a number of men renowned for their doctrine … Who 
does not know those great names of the Republic of Letters, Taurellus the 
philosopher, Scipione Gentili the jurist, Rittershausen the philologist? Who does 
not know Piccart the logician, Praetorius the mathematician and friend of the noble 
Dudith, Soner the most excellent natural philosopher and physician, Virdungus the 




For the purpose of this paper, Scipione Gentili (1563–1613), Konrad Rittershausen (1560–
1613), and Michael Piccart (1574–1620) deserve special attention. Besides their expertise in 
law, Rittershausen and Gentili were renowned philologists, something that might have attracted 
students like Crell, who studied philology and ancient languages (Greek and Hebrew) in 
Altdorf. Gentili particularly applied philology to the study of the corpus iuris.31 Moreover, he 
never discussed theological matters and never subscribed to a confession of faith, something 
that might hint at latitudinarian views in religion that the anti-Trinitarians would have certainly 
appreciated.32 This is likely the reason why the German philologist Thomas Crenius suggested 
Gentili’s alleged heterodoxy, reminding his readers that Gentili taught at Altdorf exactly when 
Socinianism was spreading.33 A few years later, the Lutheran theologian Gustav Georg Zeltner 
claimed that these accusations were unfounded, but one of Gentili’s students, Johann Gerard 
Frauenburger, did indeed belong to the anti-Trinitarian circle in Altdorf.34 Frauenburger would 
then become professor of law at Altdorf in 1618 and publish a disputation on warfare in 1630.35 
Finally, Piccart’s interest in Aristotelianism was shared by the circle of people around Soner. 
In 1609, Soner began giving private lectures on Aristotle’s metaphysics to some students and 
many anti-Trinitarian students participated in these lectures.36 Therefore, it is not surprising 
that ‘in the writings of Crell can be seen a blend of Socinianism, Protestant Aristotelianism and 
concepts derived from Roman law’.37 In Altdorf, Gentili, Rittershausen, and Piccart also 
discussed the ius belli. Gentili and Piccart published two disputations on the legitimacy of 
warfare in 1599 and 1618, while Rittershausen published a disputation on the ius civilis that 
included also some theses on the ius belli in 1611. Lectures and disputations were the two 
principal modes of instruction in early modern university. Disputations were formal debates in 
which students sustained, attacked, or defended a question set by the professor, using the 
resources provided for them by the professor’s lectures. They were ‘used as part of the regular 
curriculum, taking place weekly and in some cases even daily’.38 Therefore, these disputations 
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on the ius belli were well known among the students, including the anti-Trinitarians and young 
Brethren enrolled in the Academia Norica in those years. In the following, I focus only on 
Gentili and Rittershausen, as Piccart’s disputation is almost identical in structure and content 
to Gentili’s.39 
In the ‘Disputation on the Law of War’, Gentili defines a war as a just fight between 
two equals.40 Therefore, there can be a war only between sovereigns or free nations, which 
should be waged only when there is no other way of resolving disputes. Only necessity can 
bring forth a war.41 Moreover, a war is just only if its causes and the way in which is waged 
and carried out are just.42 ‘A most just cause of war is defense’, Gentili writes, ‘and this is 
threefold, necessary, useful, and honest’.43 Defense is necessary when people are assailed or a 
war is declared and prepared by enemies. Defense is useful when someone fears being 
oppressed by another, while it is honorable when someone without any fear of danger helps 
someone else because of the natural fellowship among people. Rather, Gentili adds, everyone 
is bound to defend another, especially a neighbor or an ally.44 This means that it is legitimate 
to help the subjects of another country against their ruler, ‘and it is more legitimate, if they, 
friends or neighbors, are forced by a tyrannical power’.45 As for religious wars, Gentili regards 
as unjust those wars waged to compel a nation or some people to a religion, even if it is a most 
just cause of war to defend religion against the impious.46 Gentili never mentions the natural 
law vim vi repellere, but there is no doubt that his emphasis on defense as a just cause of war 
relies on it. In one of the ‘Annotations on Torquato Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata’, Gentili 
writes that ‘no law is more holy than that of nature, which orders us to defend our well-being 
and faculties from the force and wrongdoing of enemies’.47  
Gentili’s assertions on the legitimacy of intervening in defense of other countries seem 
to allow people to resist their ruler, especially if she or he is a tyrant. This is how, for instance, 
Cornel Zwierlein has interpreted these statements.48 On the other hand, in his examination of 
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Gentili’s ‘Annotations’, Alberto Clerici has argued that Gentili seemed to favor a third way 
between those defending absolute obedience to a ruler and those defending the right to resist a 
tyrant: it is not legitimate to take arms against a sovereign, but it is legitimate to ask for help 
from foreign sovereigns in order to overthrow a tyrant.49 Gentili’s ‘Disputation’ strengthens 
this interpretation and places him in a broader European debate on the right of states to 
intervene in one another’s affairs.50 Indeed, Gentili openly writes that private people cannot 
‘move a war or make peace without a public decree’, reinforcing the idea that this is akin to 
laesa majestas, while regarding as legitimate the defense of other nations and people against a 
tyrant.51  
Rittershausen did not openly discuss the ius belli, but there are some references on the 
topic of warfare and its legitimacy in his ‘Theses on the Civil Law’, discussed in the Academy 
and published in 1611.52 According to Rittershausen, there are supreme and lesser magistrates, 
the former having the supreme power in the commonwealth, the latter holding less important 
offices.53 The supreme magistrate has the right to declare and put an end to wars, among other 
prerogatives.54 In this thesis, Rittershausen briefly discusses the topic of warfare, without 
entering into much detail and just quoting a series of scholars who treated this topic more 
thoroughly, including Alberico Gentili.55 Then, Rittershausen proceeds in answering a question 
that was particularly relevant for the Brethren: ‘whether all who have been summoned by the 
sovereign are bound to go to war’. ‘According to the Roman law’, Rittershausen writes, ‘almost 
all people … were compelled to the military service and it was regarded as a major crime to 
refuse duty of the military service’. As for the present time, however, Rittershausen 
distinguishes two cases: when ‘a realm is invaded and there are not enough soldiers’ and when, 
on the contrary, soldiers are sufficient to defend the country. In the first case, ‘all who are 
suitable can be compelled to the military service’, while in the other case ‘only the nobles and 
those who have a knight’s fee are obliged to this service’. All other citizens can pay taxes and 
13 
 
tributes to avoid going to war.56 For the Brethren reading this thesis, this meant that at least the 
members of the gentry had a legal duty to defend their country when invaded. As for religious 
wars, Rittershausen rejects the very idea of religious warfare as Gentili did.57  
 When considering the broader sixteenth- and seventeenth-century debate on the ius 
belli or the ius gladii, it is clear that Gentili’s and Rittershausen’s position was not particularly 
original. Rather, they defended views on the legitimacy of warfare and of religious defensive 
wars consistent with the standard Lutheran approach to these topics as developed, for instance, 
by Melanchthon.58 While not particularly innovative form a Protestant point of view, Gentili’s 
and Rittershausen’s ideas were certainly original for the young Brethren studying in Altdorf. 
Crell, Przypkowksi, and Szlichtyng stayed in the German Academy in different times between 
1606 and 1616. Szlichtyng spent only a few months in Altdorf, arriving in 1616 when the 
‘Socinian scandal’ was reaching his peak, but Crell, his friend and mentor, stayed in Altdorf 
from 1606 to 1613. In 1616, Szlichtyng and Przypkowski, who was at the Academy since 1614, 
moved to Leiden, before returning in Poland.59 The new generation of Brethren thus certainly 
knew the views of Gentili and Rittershausen. The ideas on magistracy and warfare that Crell, 
Szlichtyng, and Przypkowski personally encountered at Altdorf undoubtedly gave them a new 
awareness of the debates on the ius belli and ius gladii which certainly contributed to a revision 
of the Brethren approach to politics and religion.  
 
III 
By the late 1610s and beginning of the 1620s, many of the first spokespersons among the 
Brethren were dead: Socinus died in 1604, Ostorodt in 1611, Smalcius in 1622, Moskorowski 
in 1625. A new generation of scholars was ready to take over the leadership of the Minor 
Church. Crell was one of the leading figures among the Brethren in the 1620s. After leaving 
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Altdorf in November 1613, Crell moved to Poland and reached Raków, where he stayed until 
he died in 1633. In 1616, he became the rector of the Racovian Academy.60 
Crell had developed a different attitude towards the secular magistrate and the duties of 
Christians as citizens by 1623, when he published his reply to the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, 
who had attacked Socinus’s opinions on the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction.61 According to 
Sarah Mortimer, Crell ‘needed also to reassure his readers that Socinus’s views did not 
undermine civil government’ and thus, he ‘included a lengthy explanation of the origins of 
legitimate government’.62 Crell argued that each individual has a natural desire based on one’s 
anger to harm those who had harmed us, which gives rise to a natural and individual ius gladii.63 
This right does not compel one to act in a specific way, because rights are instruments, not 
duties, to be used as the owner sees fit.64 As long as the punishment does not exceed the injury 
received, the ius gladii is ‘in itself neither good nor bad but rather a tool which could be used 
rightly or wrongly’.65 The law of proportion between injury and punishment is thus 
fundamental in Crell’s thinking. Crell proceeded then to argue that men and women chose to 
yield their right of punishment and to live under a ruler, believing that a settled government 
would be in their own best interests. In other words, ‘government was set up on utilitarian 
grounds, based upon an act of consent’.66 This also means that the magistrate’s ius gladii 
originates from the natural right of each person living inside the community and, therefore, he 
or she is allowed to use it as he sees fit, as long as the punishment does not exceed the crime.67  
Crell defended this conclusion in his lectures on Romans delivered during his time at 
Raków.68 Lecturing on Romans 13.1, Crell put forward three ideas: all people (be they 
Christian or not) must obey ‘those who have the authority or the right to govern others’; 
obedience must be absolute, as long as the civil authorities do not command something against 
God’s order, in which case ‘one should obey God rather than the magistrate’; magistrates 
receive their authority from God, because ‘all authority comes from God’.69 Reading Romans 
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13.4, Crell emphasizes again an unconditional obedience toward the magistrate: ‘[The 
magistrate] is God’s minister for you in good. Therefore, you must submit to the authority … 
no one is appointed as God’s ministers if not by God’s authority and will’.70 On the other hand, 
if secular authority comes from God, Christians can then hold public offices as well. Indeed, 
in his own commentary to Romans, written in the last years of his life, Szlichtyng openly rejects 
the arguments of those stating that Christians cannot hold public offices and writes that, on the 
contrary, no one is better suited to be a ruler: ‘who will keep Christians from this duty’, 
Szlichtyng asks rhetorically, ‘and will not rather ask through prayers either that all kings 
become Christian or all Christians become kings?’71  
Revising the more moderate views of those Brethren who allowed Christian magistrates 
so long as they refrained from killing or severely wounding anyone, Crell argues for an ius 
gladii that includes all kinds of punishments, even the death penalty:  
 
[The magistrate] does not bear the sword in vain. Not at leisure, without purpose, 
without deliberation, and in vain. The sword is the means of punishment, and the 
death penalty is the most common means. Therefore, according to jurists and 
common speech, the right or authority of the sword is understood as the authority 
to inflict the death penalty … all kinds of punishments are tacitly included under 
the sword … these words of the Apostle wanted wrongdoers and those who are 
refractory to the magistrates to fear the punishment. And he added: [the magistrate] 
is God’s minister, so that no one would think that the magistrate inflicts this 




Interpreting the same passage, Szlichtyng agrees with Crell and writes that ‘the magistrate has 
also the right and authority of punishing through the sword, that is, of killing criminals’, 
because the sword ‘is the means to behead and kill a man’. And the magistrate could not 
accomplish his office ‘without the right and authority of the sword’.73 Szlichtyng had already 
developed these ideas in his reply to the German theologian Balthasar Meisner in 1636.74 
Without denying that Christ’s precepts are universal and thus bind all Christians, Szlichtyng 
argues that the status of a magistrate, either supreme or lesser, differs from that of private 
Christians, as the magistrate received his office from God, including the ius gladii, which is 
entrusted to the magistrate by God together with the office. Therefore, the magistrate is still 
bound to follow Christ’s precept to love both one’s neighbour and enemy, but this does not 
mean that he cannot exercise his ius gladii, but rather that he should use moderation in his 
duties.75 However, the magistrate’s office and duties include defending the innocents and 
punishing those who are dishonest, and consequently he must punish criminals, even with the 
death penalty, as long as the punishment does not exceed the crime.76 
Neither Crell nor Szlichtyng restrained the rights and duties of civil offices within a 
commonwealth. Szlichtyng went even further by examining whether Christians go against 
God’s laws when participating in defensive wars. Distinguishing necessary defence into private 
and public, the latter being the war waged by the legitimate magistrate, Szlichtyng states that 
Socinus did not disapprove warfare broadly conceived, but only those wars waged by private 
persons:  
 
Although he [Socinus] indeed disapproves war, that is, the repelling of enemies 
connected with their death, and he says that it is contrary to Christ’s precepts, he 
does not speak, however, of the war or slaughter of invading enemies that the 
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magistrate carries through to preserve the commonwealth, after hiring soldiers for 
this matter; but [he speaks of the war] that Christians begin spontaneously, allowing 
themselves to be hired for and employed in such a war voluntarily.77  
 
Socinus actually condemned warfare broadly conceived, but Szlichtyng uses Socinus’s name 
to put forward his own ideas as if they had always been the Brethren’s mainstream opinion on 
defensive wars. If Socinus/Szlichtyng believes that wars waged by the magistrates to preserve 
the commonwealth are not contrary to Christ’s precepts, it is clear that Christian magistrates 
can wage such defensive necessary wars. Szlichtyng rejects almost all causes of just war listed 
by Meisner, especially those related to religion.78 After all, the Christian magistrate is bound 
to love even his enemies and thus he should avoid waging war as much as he can.79 However, 
if the very existence of the commonwealth is at stake, then even the Christian magistrate is 
allowed to wage a defensive war. Mentioning ‘the repelling of servitude and violence, the 
preservation of freedom, life, and public peace’ as goals that should be pursued through a war, 
Szlichtyng does not deny them, ‘because we Brethren do not dispute the war begun by the 
magistrate for public security because of a pressing necessity’.80 Arguing that even non-
Christian authors allowed fewer just causes of war than Meisner did, as they usually regarded 
only the repelling of force and the defence of oneself and one’s relatives, the claiming of stolen 
goods, and the revenge for offences as just causes of wars, Szlichtyng urges Christians merely 
to act with moderation and try to avoid wars as much as possible.81 
If Christian magistrates are allowed to wage wars in certain circumstances, private 
Christians can also participate in these same wars as long as they do not do so voluntarily. As 
stated in the passage quoted above, Socinus/Szlichtyng only rejected those wars that ‘Christians 
begin spontaneously, allowing themselves to be hired for and employed in such a war 
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voluntarily’. The Latin words sponte and ultro, ‘spontaneously’ and ‘voluntarily’, are the 
conditions that make this participation illegitimate. Indeed, when discussing Meisner’s 
argument for necessary defensive warfare based on the natural law vim vi repellere, Szlichtyng 
writes that ‘we Brethren do not argue anything against this argument’, if it is used to argue for 
‘the war undertaken by the magistrate against a public enemy’. Szlichtyng only denies that this 
natural law can be used to defend those wars that ‘private persons join spontaneously and 
voluntarily’.82 And again, discussing Meisner’s arguments based on the evidence from the 
Church Fathers, Szlichtyng states that those passages ‘are by no means contrary to us, because 
they treat the wars began by the magistrate for the public safety’. ‘We’, Szlichtyng continues, 
‘blame those who, while being Christians, enlist voluntarily in the military service and devote 
their effort to the killing of enemies’.83 Therefore, it can be assumed that Christians are allowed 
to go to war when following the legitimate magistrate’s command. Rather, since all people 
must always obey their magistrate, they must follow her or him in war when ordered to do so. 
In Quaestiones duae, Szlichtyng does not expand on his theory of legitimate warfare, but it 
seems that the divine office of magistracy provides such a legitimacy. All Christians are bound 
to follow Christ’s precept to love one’s enemy, but it is nevertheless licit for Christian 
magistrate to wage defensive war, because they received their office from God and this includes 
the protection of the commonwealth. And even if private Christians are bound to the same love, 
they are also bound by divine law to an absolute obedience towards the magistrate and this 
allows them to participate in defensive wars. Magistracy and obedience to magistracy create 
an exception to that divine law prescribing universal love, rather than contradicting it, and thus 
they provide legitimacy to necessary defensive warfare.84 
Despite Crell’s and Szlichting’s far-reaching attempt of revising the history of the 
Brethren’s approach to magistracy and warfare, the pacifist wing of the Minor Church 
continued to attract adherents, as proven by the controversy in the late 1640s between 
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Szlichtyng and Johann Ludwig von Wolzogen (1599–1661), an Austrian noblemen and 
member of the Brethren who re-stated the original pacifist views of the Minor Church. 
However, the pacifist wing gradually became the minority among the Brethren. The last edition 
of the Racovian Catechism provides evidence of this.85 The text of this edition is the same 
published in 1665, which included revisions made by Crell, Szlichtyng, and likely others, but 
in 1684, the editors added some notes to explain passages of the Catechism. In one of the 
passages emphasizing the legitimacy of magistracy, Benedykt Wiszowaty (c.1650–c.1704), 
great-grandson of Socinus and sharing the pacifism of his great-grandfather, added a note 
explaining that the first leaders of the Minor Church held quite different views on magistracy 
and that for Christians would be better ‘to relinquish civil magistracy to the men of this world’ 
and ‘to refrain from usurping for themselves the right of exercising authority over others, and 
much more of shedding human blood’.86 Wiszowaty was aware, however, that the pacifists had 
been a minority for a long time, stating that Szlichtyng ‘with many of his contemporaries, 
members of these churches, was of a contrary opinion’.87 
 
IV 
In conclusion, solid evidence proves that Crell and Szlichtyng had changed their views on 
politics and religion before the mid-seventeenth century. Answering the three questions raised 
at the beginning of this paper, Crell and Szlichtying would have replied that: it is legitimate for 
Christians to hold public offices, because in doing so they fulfil God’s will; it is legitimate for 
Christian magistrates to make use of their ius gladii, even by inflicting the death penalty, as 
long as they use Christian moderation and there is a rightful proportion between crime and 
punishment; it is also legitimate for Christian magistrates to wage defensive war when the 
safety of the commonwealth and its people is at stake, as long as there is no other means to 
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avoid this war and to save one’s country; finally, it is legitimate for private Christians to 
participate in defensive wars, as long as they do not do so voluntarily, but compelled by their 
lawful sovereign and necessity. When examining the controversy between Szlichtyng and 
Wolzogen in the late 1640s and 1650s, Kot showed that Szlichtyng defended these same 
ideas.88 Kot, however, failed to notice that Crell and Szlichtyng had already developed them in 
the years between 1623 and 1636, during the Thirty Years War, not afterwards.89 
I have also suggested two reasons that can explain why Crell and Szlichtyng to moved 
away from the original pacifism of the Minor Church. The first is the almost continuous warfare 
that characterized the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the first decades of 
the seventeenth century. As citizens of the Commonwealth and active members of the king’s 
court, noblemen and gentry men belonging to the Minor Church strived to defend their estates 
and their country, and thus they wished to conciliate their faith with the holding of public 
offices and the participation of wars. This was required even more since Polish Catholics also 
attacked the Brethren for their socio-political ideas, as well as for their theological beliefs. 
Therefore, I do agree with Kot and Tazbir in seeing the historical wars fought by the 
Commonwealth as one of the reasons behind the Brethren’s changed view, but instead of 
referring to the Cossack invasions in the early 1650s, I regard the much earlier attacks by the 
Tatars and the Turks, and the wars against Sweden and Muscovy in the 1620s and 1630s as the 
historical events pushing the Brethren to more lenient views on magistracy and warfare.90  
The second suggested reason is the openness of the second-generation of Brethren 
towards the European intellectual world, as young Brethren began studying in different 
universities and academies across Europe. I have focused on the Lutheran Academy of Altdorf, 
as it was the most famous institution where young Brethren carried out their higher education 
until the mid-1610s. Relevant literature on the history of the Brethren stressed the significance 
of this Academy mainly because of the leading German anti-Trinitarian of the time teaching in 
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Altdorf, Ernst Soner. I have further revealed that other intellectuals lecturing at the Academia 
Norica had a likely impact on the young Brethren’s education as well, focusing on Gentili’s 
and Rittershausen’s disputations on the ius belli and ius gladii. These were not particularly 
innovative within the Protestant tradition, but they undoubtedly made Brethren such as Crell 
and Szlichtyng aware of the European debates on magistracy and warfare in a critical period 
when they were facing a range of practical political and military issues, and needed to reach 
for ideas different from those of their church. Crell and Szlichtyng would then take active part 
in such debates. Indeed, Crell began reshaping his ideas on magistracy when defending Socinus 
from Grotius’s criticisms, while Szlichtyng took a different stand on warfare when replying to 
Balthasar Meisner.  
This clearly proves that their education outside Poland and the very debates held with 
intellectuals belonging to other confessions gradually led the Brethren to revise the doctrines 
on magistracy and warfare advocated by their forefathers, and to reach a position that cannot 
be defined as standard among Protestants, but that was certainly closer to the mainstream 
Protestant approach to politics and warfare than the pacifism of the first Brethren. Szlichtying’s 
ideas on the legitimacy of defensive wars and of the non-voluntary participation of private 
Christians in them, for instance, are somewhat similar to those developed by intellectuals such 
as Lambert Daneau, Gulielmus Becanus, Johann Alsted, Hugo Grotius, and Johannes 
Hoornbeeck. Indeed, his assertions seem related to the doctrine of absolute obedience to 
sovereign authority that much characterized the Protestant thinking on warfare.91 The concept 
of the non-voluntary participation in wars seem to be part of the debates on the use of 
mercenary service as well.92 A comparative analysis of Szlichtyng’s and other Brethen’s views 
with the broader European debates on the ius belli and ius gladii is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Such an analysis, however, would undoubtedly have valuable outcomes. Kot and Tazbir, 
for instance, thought that Szlichtyng’s ideas against mercenary service were a result of the 
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aftermath of the Thirty Years War, but I have revealed that he had developed the central core 
of such ideas during the Thirty Years War and thus, an examination of how European 
intellectuals reacted to Crell’s and Szlichtyng’s new ideas on magistracy and warfare in this 
crucial period for European history would be undoubtedly beneficial. More broadly, such an 
examination might also contribute to contemporary debates on just war theory. Recent 
developments include the ideas that defensive war is not morally distinctive from individual 
self-defence or that it is morally wrong to fight in a war that is unjust.93 Although there are 
profound differences between the past and present discussions on the ius belli, Szlichtyng 
would certainly agree with such views and he would add that it is also morally wrong to 
voluntarily fight in a war that is just. Indeed, as early as the 1620s and 1630s, Crell and 
Szlichtyng developed and disseminated a position between the legitimacy of warfare and 
pacifism that can be regarded as a form of what today is called ‘contingent pacifism’.94 
Recovering these debates from a not-so-distant past might also provide contemporary scholars 
with new food for thought.  
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